The speculation continues...

I have been thinking about this since Skyping with a mentor earlier today.

Really, what could have possessed Saakashvili to think he even had a snowballs chance in hell to re-taking S. Ossetia? I mean, the Georgian military was vastly outnumbered and there was no way that Russia would not respond to a sudden military incursion into a de facto Russian province. So, I see two possibilities, and I am currently leaning towards the second.

1) Saakashvili was going for broke, thinking he would override forces (separatists and Russian peacekeepers) in S. Ossetia. His swollen military budget (and ego) and friendship with the West gave him a false sense of power. He thought he could get the Russian border ahead of Russian re-enforcements and consolidate. Maybe he also underestimated Russian resolve to control the province. Finally, he may also have counted on a strong NATO/US/EU response to Russian retaliation, forcing the Russian forces back.

or...

2) Saakashvili made this move to enhance his own power, and consolidate his position within the Western hierarchy. I came to this thought because what the end effect of his actions are, at this point, is an exposure of the West's inability to exert any control over Russia in this region. It is plain for everyone to see that Russia can regain its old Soviet sphere of influence if it felt the need. The speed at which Russian forces over ran the Georgians was rather shocking, particularly to the EU, which has some painful historical memories to a similar effect.

Ok, so what? how does this consolidate Saakashvili? Well, first off, it will play well to Georgians outside of S. Ossetia, because their leader fearlessly stood up and tried to reclaim what would be theirs. Second, it will likely re-invigorate the debate over admission to NATO. If Russia is able to so easily crush Georgia, it is clear that this territory is really their sphere of influence, and not the West's. Admitting Georgia into NATO would allow the West to beef up the forces there, and remove the State from under Russia's thumb.

So, was war the folly of one power hungry leader, or a shrewd Machiavellian move? Who knows... I'll never know all the details to really say. Plus, how would Russia react to Georgian NATO membership? Not well. The reaction would probably also manifest, in part, with a sudden drying up of energy flow into the EU.

Conditions of Liberty ~ 1/9/2008

I'm reading Conditions of Liberty by Ernest Gellner and came across this definition of Civil Society:

"Civil Society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interest, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society" (Gellner, 1994: 5).

What Gellner is talking about in his opening chapter is the resurgence of civil society in the wake of the USSR and general collapse of Marxist ideology. What is interesting in these first pages is his discussion on the reasons for the Marxist's rejection of the very concept of civil society (and the dictator's use of this rhetoric to increase their own power). Essentially, civil society exists as a counter weight to the state, and manifests itself in many different forms, thus it is by nature pluralistic and inherently divisive.

For the marxist this is high problematic not only because it prevents the ideological unification of the citizens, but because it helps support state functions, civil society prevents the so called 'withering away' of said state. This association with the state, also implies a coercive nature to civil society. In the marxist ideal, because the citizens are ideologically unified, and there is no more need for state apparatus, civil society also because redundant. J.J. Russeau had a similar problem with political parties, and advocated for a single party because if social conscience was divided, then the government would never be legitimate.

The problem I have with the marxist view, notwithstanding the effects this had when applied by the USSR et al., is that single ideology is equally as coercive and divisive, only on a larger scale. It leaves no room for dissent nor difference in thinking or appearance. Not only is this unrealistic, but also highly discriminatory. Certainly I agree there is an element of coercion to the function/activity of civil society, but it also provides opportunity for dialogue on social, cultural, economic, and political rights and needs. Without civil society, it is had to imagine how all this would be articulated.

I suppose the marxist might suggest, as Chavez does from time to time, ideas and difference can be articulated within the single party/state/ideology, and it is a more efficient method for creating consensus. Again we arrive at the same problem, that what ends up happening is just a conglomeration of difference into a single identity, with is then necessarily divided against that which it is not. A more functional solution might be not trying to change people and their identities, but rather understanding them from their own perspective, in order to solve co-habitational issues. Civil society can aid in this endeavor.